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The paper analyses the efficiency and the distributional effects of eliminating a tariff in a
protected sector, in a Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade with costs of adjustment. The tariff
can be eliminated at the onset or after a while. In case of postponing it the government may
pre-announce the policy change or may not do it and surprise the private sector. It is shown
that while large adjustment costs reduce the efficiency gains from trade liberalisation,
small to moderate adjustment costs may raise the efficiency gains from a pre-announced
liberalisation. The adjustment costs reduce the effects on factor returns from a sudden
unanticipated liberalisation. The distributional effects of trade liberalisations are more
complex when the policy is pre-announced. For small and moderate levels, the adjustment
costs may increase the effects of the policy on factor returns. Also, the “value of the
announcement” rises with the adjustment costs.
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I. Introduction
This paper analyses the welfare gains and losses from the elimination of
tariffs in the presence of costs of adjustment, using a dynamic extension of an
otherwise standard Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of trade. The paper compares
different alternatives of trade liberalisation, including a sudden unanticipated
elimination of the tariffs, a pre-announced elimination of the tariffs, and a
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postponed, but still not announced, elimination of the tariffs. We analyse both
the efficiency and the distributional effects of the trade policy. The efficiency
effects are measured as the response in the welfare of the representative agent
in a homogeneous-society version of the model, and the distributional effects
are measured by the welfare gains and losses of different individuals in a
heterogeneous-society version of the model.
Costs of adjustment arise from many sources, including hiring, firing, and
training labour, installing and adapting machines and buildings, and doing
marketing and adapting the production distribution nets. With these so many
sources of costs of adjustment, it is not obvious how the adjustment costs
function should be specified. Furthermore, there is now an extensive literature
showing that the economic dynamics associated to costly adjustment does
depend on some details of the specification of the adjustment costs function.
In one vein, some authors have emphasised the relevance of distinguishing
net from gross adjustment costs (Hamermesh, 1993; Hamermesh et al., 1994).
The former arises when the level of employment is changed, and the latter
occur whenever workers are hired or fired, even if the level of employment
remains unchanged. A similar distinction has been made for capital (Neary,
1978; Grossman, 1983; Clarete, et al., 1994). Gross adjustment costs give
rise to sector specificity and to different returns of the same production factor
across sectors.
In a related but different vein, the literature has explored the effects of
adding fixed adjustment costs, non convex adjustment costs, and  marginal
adjustment costs that do not tend to zero as the input change tends to zero
(Oi, 1962; Rothschild, 1971; Kemp and Wan, 1974; Hamermesh, 1989; among
others). This literature has shown that these adjustment cost functions may
give place to very different responses to price shocks, ranging from no response
at all to minor shocks, to immediate one-period adjustment.
We adopt a quadratic adjustment cost function, in the fashion of Sargent
(1978). In so doing, we make several choices. First, we focus on net adjustment
costs, leaving aside the costs stemming from turnover. Factors can be costlessly
moved from one sector to the other, and hence the return to production factors
is equalised across sectors. In this respect, we keep close to the standard HO
model. But because of the cost of changing the level of production, competitive
firms make non-zero profits. Hence, unlike previous models of trade97 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
liberalisation, the model in this paper exhibits changes in the value of the
firms associated to trade reforms. Besides, these changes are different across
sectors. In the real world, structural changes in which some sectors expand
and some other sectors contract seem to be associated to significant changes
in the values of the involved firms. Our model may be useful to analyse this
aspect of the liberalisation process that has received little attention in the
literature. Second, quadratic adjustment costs leave out of our analysis issues
of hysteresis and lumpy responses to shocks. Admittedly, these issues are
likely to be important in the real world. We leave them aside because we want
to preserve the HO characteristics of the model in the steady state, while
having a gradual adjustment process during the transition.
More often than not trade reforms come as a building block of a broader
package of structural reforms that include deregulations, macroeconomic
stabilisation, financial liberalisation, capital account liberalisation, and
privatisation. The question then arises about the optimal sequencing of the
reforms in these different areas. The extensive literature that deals with this
issue has come with no simple policy recipe.1 We make no attempt to provide
a general answer to this largely unsettled issue; the model in this paper is too
simple to deal with most of the effects that must be taken into account in any
comprehensive assessment of the sequencing of reforms. Notwithstanding,
our model does have some implications for the sequencing of trade
liberalisation and deregulations affecting adjustment costs. We show that, in
the case of pre-announced liberalisations, it could be optimal to postpone
deregulations that reduce (moderate) adjustment costs until tariffs have been
eliminated.
Adjustment costs have played an important role in informal arguments
that have been put forward to support the gradualist view on trade liberalisation
(see for instance, Michaely, 1986). Our analysis shows that net adjustment
costs provide no reason for delay, and hence the gradualist view must be
based on rigidities that cannot be appropriately represented with this type of
adjustment costs. We briefly review some of these sources of rigidity in the
next paragraph.
1 See, among others, Choksi and Papageorgiou (1986), Edwards (1989), Funke (1994),
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Being our goal analytic, we decided to focus on a narrow set of issues,
keeping the model as close as possible to the HO tradition, hence leaving
aside many important considerations that should not be dismissed in a balanced
assessment of trade reform. Concerns about unemployment are usually
prominent in the policy debate about trade liberalisation, despite of some
recent empirical literature indicating that the short run effects of trade
liberalisation on unemployment may be small (Papageorgiou et al., 1991;
Edwards, 1994). Early analytical treatments of this issue can be found in
Neary (1982) and Mussa (1986). Several episodes of trade liberalisation were
associated to large current account deficits and consumption booms. These
distortions have been explained in terms of  the lack of credibility of the
liberalisation process, or the hypothesis that agents think that the tariff
reduction may be temporary (Calvo, 1988; Calvo and Mendoza, 1994). Karp
and Paul (1994) analyse the optimal timing of trade reform in the presence of
congestion costs. They argue that because of congestion externalities, private
and social marginal adjustment costs may differ, and reallocation tends to
occur too rapidly. Nevertheless, they show that trade reforms should begin
with trade liberalisation, and only if the government has commitment capacity
there should be an intermediate phase with positive tariffs, followed by full
liberalisation. Investment decisions are usually costly to reverse. Coupled
with uncertainty, irreversibility may give rise to substantial inertia and
hysteresis (for a survey, see Dixit, 1992). Albuquerque and Rebelo (1998)
explore the implications of irreversible investment and uncertain duration of
the trade reform for the performance of the economy in the aftermath of the
trade liberalisation reform.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we present and solve the
formal model. In Section III, we report the main results from simulations.
Section IV concludes with some final remarks.
II. The Model
A. Production and Income
There are two productive sectors that use two factors of production, capital
and labour. The technology is assumed Cobb Douglas:99 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
Fi (Li,t, Ki,t ) = Hi (Ki,t )ai (Li,t )1-ai      i = A, B                            (1)
Competitive firms rent capital paying return rt per unit of capital to owners
of capital. Firms also hire labour, paying a wage wt to workers, and incurring
in quadratic adjustment costs when the total amount of labour occupied in the
firm is changed. With only net adjustment costs, there is no significant
difference between labour and capital adjustment costs. Indeed, we are
assuming that there is a cost associated to changing the level of production.
For ease of computation, we write it as a cost of changing the employment of
a production factor, but it can be shown that there is an equivalent formulation
in terms of the other production factor and still another equivalent formulation
in terms of output.
Individual firms do not control prices of production factor services nor
prices of goods Pi,t. Entrepreneurs in sector i choose the path of labour and
capital to maximise the value of the firm:2
where ai is the adjustment cost parameter in sector i,    and      are the factor
endowments,          is the initial allocation of labour, and Rs is the interest rate.
The first order conditions are:
2 In order to simplify notation the same symbols represent both the employment of the firm
and that of the whole sector.
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In the tradition of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, we assume that factor
endowments in the economy are fixed. There is no capital accumulation, and
no demographic growth. Markets are competitive and prices are fully flexible,
so the markets for production factors clear in every moment:
The economy is small. Domestic events do not modify international prices
P*
i, t, but the government sets taxes and subsidies on foreign trade ti,t that alter
domestic prices (the foreign exchange rate is normalised to 1):
There is no international borrowing and lending. The interest rates are
determined to clear domestic credit markets (see next section).
Equations (3) to (7) define a system of non-linear second-order difference
equations, that can be solved for eight endogenous variables: LA, t, LB, t, KA, t,
KB, t, rt, wt, PA, t and PB, t. Two points in the path of each of the two dynamic
variables (LA, t and LB, t) must be given to pin down a particular solution. It is
natural to set the initial level of employment, LA, -1 and, LB, -1 as one of those
points. Infinite paths are still consistent with both the system (3) to (7) and
initial employment, but the saddle path dynamics of this system imply that
firms can rule out all save one path, the one converging to the steady state.
Other paths are diverging and eventually violate the employment constraints
in the firms’ programs ( ) , 0. it LL ££  Rationality hence implies that the
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economy eventually converges to the steady state. Output in both sectors can
be computed using the paths of capital and labour and equation (1).
Profits are zero in the long run, but not during the transition. In the steady
state, when employment stabilises, production factors are paid their marginal
product (see equations (3) and (4)). This result and the assumption of constant
returns to scale imply zero profits in the long run. During the transition,
adjustment costs operate as barriers to entry and exit and firms make profits
or loses. Accordingly, there is a value attached to the firm. Interestingly, the
simulation results presented below show that there is no simple relationship
between the performance of the sector, as measured by output or employment,
and the value of the firms. Depending on the timing of the announcements
and the implementation of trade liberalisation, firms in the contracting sectors
may make loses or profits.
B. Consumption, Interest Rates and Foreign Trade
We develop two versions of the model, one with homogeneous and the
other with heterogeneous population. The representative agent version of the
model allows us to focus on the efficiency effects of trade liberalisation,
postponing the analysis of the distributional effects of this policy. The
heterogeneous population version of the model assumes that the property
rights over the production factors and the firms are non-uniformly distributed
in the population. The productive sector is the same in both versions. Like in
the static HO model, the productive decisions do not depend on the distribution
of the property rights over production factors. We present the representative
agent version first and the heterogeneous population model later in this same
section.
B.1. The Representative Agent Model
The economy is populated by a constant number of identical and infinitely
lived individuals. In order to simplify notation, the size of the population is
normalised to 1. The same symbol represents both the aggregate and the
individual variables. Individuals own the production factors and the firms.
Hence, both the returns of the production factors and the benefits of the firms102 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
add to individuals’ income, and this sum equals gross revenues of the firms
                                                               Individuals also receive a uniform
lump-sum transfer from the government bt.3 To keep as close as possible to
the conventional HO model, we get rid off accumulation of goods by
assuming that both goods are perishable. Individuals can accumulate net
financial assets At, borrowing and lending at the interest rate Rt.
The utility function is additively separable in time, with discount factor b.
Per period utility is Cobb-Douglas in consumption of both goods.
This program yields corner solutions, in terms of the choice of present
versus future consumption, for most combinations of values of parameters
and of exogenous variables. These solutions imply that the consumer chooses
either to consume all his wealth in the first period and nothing therein or, in
the other extreme, to indefinitely postpone consumption. In the first case, all
families would want to borrow in the first period and the credit market would
be in excess demand. The interest rate would necessarily rise. In the second
extreme case, all families would want to lend so there would be an excess
supply of loans. The interest rate would fall. There is an intermediate value of
the interest rate such that individuals’ plans can be consistent in the aggregate.
We derive the expression for this equilibrium interest rate in the appendix,
and reproduce it here as:
3 This assumption is discussed in the following section.
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Therefore, the equilibrium real interest rate equalises the subjective
discount rate, with the real interest rate computed with the relevant price
index for this economy ( )
1
,, . tAtBt PPP
qq - = 4
Two different consumption decisions are embedded in program (8). One
is an intratemporal decision: how much to consume of each good within each
period. The first order conditions indicate that the composition of the
consumption basket in each period must be determined according to the
following rule:
The other decision consumers must make is intertemporal in nature: how
much to consume today and how much tomorrow. Consumers are indifferent
between consuming today or tomorrow, when the interest rate satisfies equation
(9) (see the Appendix for the details). Hence, individual consumption is not
fully determined by program (8).
Goods markets are in equilibrium when output plus net imports Mi, t equal
domestic consumption. There is no accumulation of goods, for goods are
assumed perishable.
The assumption that there is no international credit implies that the current
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The system of equations (10) to (12) determine consumption and net imports
in both sectors, given prices and output.
B.2. The Heterogeneous Population Model
Individuals in this economy may receive income from five different sources:
wages, returns to capital, profits of firms in sector A, profits of firms in sector
B, and transfers from the government. Individual ‘h’ solves the following
program:
where       are the profits that agent ‘h’ makes from the property of firms in
sector i. Adding the individual budget constraints over ‘h’ gives the
representative agent resource constraint in equation (8).
Equations (9) and (10) continue to hold, and hence the consumption basket
has the same composition for all consumers. The difference is in the level:
consumers with more resources will enjoy larger consumption. We use these
properties in the simulations below to compute the welfare gains from different
groups of individuals.
C. The Government
The government sets taxes and subsidies on foreign trade, driving a wedge
between domestic and foreign prices. The proceeds of net taxes on foreign
trade are distributed uniformly among individuals in a lump-sum fashion.




, t M P M P t B t B t A t A (12)





























t B t B
h
t A t A
q q
b

















t i B ,







































££££105 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
Hence, the government budget is balanced in each period. This assumption
allows us to focus on the straight effects from trade policy.
Note that ti, t represent several trade policy instruments. It is an import tariff if
Mi, t > 0 and ti, t > 0; it is an import subsidy if Mi, t > 0 and ti, t < 0; it is an export
tax if Mi, t < 0 and ti, t < 0; and it is an export subsidy if Mi, t  < 0 and ti, t > 0. Taxes
and subsidies on foreign trade are policy instruments, while the lump-sum
transfers are endogenously determined by the government budget (14).
D. The Phase Diagram
The qualitative properties of the model can be analysed with the help of a
phase diagram. The model exhibits saddle path dynamics, and the steady
state is the standard static HO equilibrium. Equations (4) to (6) imply that:
These equations define two implicit functions mapping employment into
capital in each sector:
with first derivaties:
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The fundamental dynamic equation of the model follows from equations
(3), (5) and (16):
This non-linear-second-order difference equation in employment determines
a family of integral curves. Two additional conditions are needed to pin down
a particular solution to equation (18). One is the initial level of employment.
The other is a transversality condition, implicit in the feasibility constraint that
employment in any sector is non negative and smaller than or equal to total
labour supply. It is shown below that all save one path eventually violate this
feasibility constraint.
It proves useful to write equation (18) as a first-order system in the level
and the first difference of employment:
The phase diagram of this system will be represented in (LA, t-1, Xt-1). We
will first derive the phase line for constant employment (and the consequence
dynamics) and then the  phase line for constant variation of employment (and
its respective dynamics).
(i) The locus of constant employment, LA, t = LA, t-1. Equation (20) imply that
this locus is Xt-1 = 0.
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(ii) Dynamics of employment,
(iii) The locus of constant variation of employment, Xt = Xt-1.  The condition
that defines this locus is: Xt = Xt-1 = LA,t = LA,t-1;  using this condition in (19):
The locus of constant variation of employment crosses the locus of constant
employment in the steady state. Its slope can be positive or negative, depending
on the parameter values.
(iv) The dynamics of the variation of employment. Equations (19) and (20)
imply that:
Xt is increasing to the right and decreasing to the left of the locus of constant
Xt. Indeed, from (4) and (21):
( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , 1 1 , , < = > < = > - = D - - t t A t A A X if L L L
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where ki, t denotes capital per capita in sector i. The results in (i) to (iv)
determine the phase diagram presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The Phase Diagram
 
LA,t-1 
   Xt-1 
  0 
Case 1: The locus of 
constant X has negative 
slope 
 
Case 2: The locus of 
constant X has positive 
slope 
The economy exhibits saddle path dynamics. Firms choose how much to
increase  or  decrease  employment  from  the  current  to the next period
(Xt-1 = LA, t – LA, t-1), given previous period employment LA, t-1. Rational
entrepreneurs pick the value of Xt-1 on the saddle path, for any other choice
would put the economy on an unsustainable path that eventually violates the
feasibility conditions of employment
E. Comparative Dynamics
Consider an increase in the price of sector A that moves the economy away
from an initial steady state. The steady state level of employment in sector A
rises, and hence both the locus of constant variation of employment (Xt = Xt-1)
and the saddle path shift to the right. Sector A starts hiring new labour. Unlike
in the static models, employment does not jump immediately to the new steady
state (the new equilibrium in the static model), because of costs of adjustment
(see Figure 2). Doing all the adjustment instantly would involve incurring in
huge adjustment costs. Rather, entrepreneurs in sector A expand employment
gradually, at a pace dictated by the saddle path. Firms in sector B reduce
employment at the same velocity firms in sector A expand it, so that total
employment remains equal to the exogenous labour supply  (see equation (5)).
( ) , 0. At LL ££
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Figure 2. The Dynamics of Employment in Sector A after
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Moving capital is costless in this model. Nevertheless, capital moves
gradually from sector B to sector A, at the pace dictated by the movement of
labour (equation (17)). Firms in the expanding sector do not want to hire
more capital they can efficiently use with the workers they have in each period.
Firms in the contracting sector remain using for a while some of the capital
they will eventually free. The adjustment costs in one factor determine a slow
adjustment not only in that factor but also in other production factors.
The speed of adjustment depends on the adjustment costs in both sectors
(equation (19)). The adjustment in sector A is slower the higher is the
adjustment cost parameter in sector A, but also in sector B. Firms facing
these costs adjust slowly; this is the direct and more obvious effect. But there
are also indirect general equilibrium effects going through the returns of
production factors that determine a slow adjustment also in the other sector
(equations (3)).
The increase in the price of sector A induces a change in the consumption
basket. Families reduce consumption of good A relative to good B. Net imports
of sector A shrink as production in the sector rises and domestic consumption
of this good decreases. Net imports of sector B rise as production reduce and
domestic consumption of B increases.110 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
III. Trade Liberalisation, Some Simulation Results
A. Liberalise Now or Later?
Should the government liberalise foreign trade once and for all or should
it make the announcement first and give the private sector some time to adjust?
There is no point in waiting if, as it is assumed in the standard static HO
model of trade, adjusting is costless. But, does this conclusion extend to the
more realistic case in which firms do incur in adjustment costs? According to
the static HO model, trade liberalisation is good because it induces a more
efficient allocation of resources. But, what would be the benefits from trade
liberalisation if, because of adjustment costs, resources do not reallocate or
do it very slowly? Do adjustment costs provide a rationale for delay or even
no liberalisation?
To answer these questions, we compare the general equilibrium welfare
effects of eliminating tariffs now or, alternatively, announcing now that tariffs
will be eliminated in the future (first two rows in Table 1). Table 1 presents
the welfare gains defined as the difference between the sum of discounted
utilities with and without trade liberalisation. There is a 15 per cent tariff on
the capital intensive import sector in the initial steady state. We consider five
values of the adjustment cost parameter, including the limiting case in which
the cost of adjustment is zero.
The first conclusion we can draw from Table 1 is that trade liberalisation
increases welfare-welfare gains are positive in all these cases. Hence,
adjustment costs do not seem to justify keeping positive tariffs, at least not in
the scenarios presented in this table. A second conclusion is that liberalising
now is better than waiting. Welfare increases more with a sudden immediate
tariff elimination than with a postponement and this is so for all the parameter
levels considered in these simulations. Welfare gains from a sudden
unanticipated trade liberalisation are decreasing in the adjustment parameter
(first row in Table 1). Adjustment costs slow down the reallocation of resources
and hence reduce the efficiency gains from free trade. In the extreme case of
infinite adjustment costs, liberalisation does not induce any reallocation at all.
Nevertheless, small to moderate adjustment costs raise the welfare gains
from a pre-announced cut in tariffs (second row in Table 1). Because of111 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
Table 1. Welfare Gains from Trade Liberalisation, Representative Agent
Model
Adjustment cost level
               Timing Null Low Moderate Moderate High
low high
Unanticipated liberalisation
in period 0 516 510 486 411 251
Liberalisation in period 20,
announced in period 0 194 197 204 219 170
Liberalisation in period 20,
announced in period 20 194 192 183 155   95
adjustment costs, firms start reallocating resources when the government
announces that the tariff will be eliminated. Without these costs, firms would
not begin the adjustment until the tariff is eliminated. Therefore, the adjustment
costs may have a positive effect on economic efficiency after the announcement
and before the implementation of the tariff reduction. Adjustment costs still
slow down the reallocation of resources after the tariff reduction. These
countervailing effects determine that welfare gains from a postponed
announced liberalisation are not monotonic in the adjustment parameter.
The effects of the adjustment costs on the welfare gains from trade
liberalisation can be interpreted in the light of taxation theory. The larger the
tax elasticity of a tax base the larger the welfare losses caused by a distortionary
tax, and the larger the welfare gains from eliminating the tax. Adjustment
costs reduce the contemporaneous tax elasticity of output, and postpone the
efficiency gains from a reduction of a tariff. Hence, the discounted sum of
efficiency gains from a sudden and permanent tariff reduction is a decreasing
function of these costs. Infinitely large adjustment costs would turn the tariff
into a non-distortionary tax. Eliminating the tariff would not contribute to
raise efficiency in such a case. But moderate adjustment costs increase the112 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
elasticity of current output to a tariff reduction that is known to take place in
the future. Therefore, the discounted sum of efficiency gains from a pre-
announced liberalisation is an increasing function of the adjustment cost
parameter for a range of values.
B. The Value of Pre-announcing Trade Liberalisation
According to the results discussed above, postponing trade liberalisation
reduces the welfare gains from this policy. Therefore, there seems to be no room
for pre-announcing it. However, real-world changes in trade policy usually take
time. Governments seldom eliminate barriers to trade unilaterally. They rather
do it after extensive negotiations with other governments. In this more realistic
scenario, which are the effects of announcing that barriers to trade will be
eliminated in the future? Does the anticipation of tariff reductions increase
welfare?
Anticipation of tariff reductions makes future consumption relatively less
expensive than current consumption, inducing higher domestic savings and a
surplus in the current account of the balance of payments. This phenomenon
is the reverse of the well known consumption boom and current account deficit
that have been associated to trade liberalisations that are thought to be
temporary (Calvo, 1988). The policy implications of this phenomenon in terms
of the timing of trade and financial liberalisations have been extensively
analysed in the literature (Falvey and Kim, 1992). The productive effects of
expected variations in tariffs have been far less analysed.5 In order to focus
on the productive dynamic effects of a pre-announced liberalisation, we get
rid off the consumption and savings effects, assuming that the goods are
perishable and that the economy has no access to international credit markets.
The standard HO model highlights the static productive distortions caused by
tariffs. The dynamic version presented in this paper allows for the simultaneous
analysis of the static and the dynamic distortions in the allocation of resources.
In principle, good information about economic policy helps private agents
to make the right choices. But announcing a tariff reduction adds an inter-
temporal distortion to the existing intra-temporal distortion caused by the
5 Leamer (1980) analyses these effects in a very simplified two-periods economy.113 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
tariff. The goods affected by the tariff become relatively more expensive not
only with respect to other goods in the same period, but also with respect to
the same goods in the future. Yet, because of the second-best principle, it is
not a-priori obvious whether adding this inter-temporal distortion increases
or decreases welfare. To address this issue, we simulated an elimination of
the tariff in period twenty, assuming first that agents are informed about this
policy in period zero, and assuming later that agents learn about this policy
only when the tariff reduction takes place –i.e. agents are surprised–.
The results summarised in Table 1 (rows 2 and 3) indicate that a pre-
announced trade liberalisation is more beneficial than a surprise one, i.e. there
is a positive value associated with the announcement when there are adjustment
costs. Because of them, the reallocation of resources that enhances efficiency
begins when the tariff elimination is announced (Figure 3). Therefore, the
announcement should not be delayed.
The welfare gains caused by announcing the trade liberalisation –the “value
of the announcement”– depend on the adjustment cost parameter. With zero
adjustment costs, the information that the tariff will be reduced does not raise
welfare. If reallocating resources is costless, firms do not start reallocating
productive factors until the tariff is actually reduced, no matter whether they
learn about the reduction before or in the very moment in which it takes
place. In the simulations reported in Table 1, the “value of the announcement”
increases with the adjustment cost parameter. After the announcement and
Figure 3. Employment in the Expanding Sector
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before the tariff is actually eliminated, firms reallocate resources faster the
more costly is to do it.
C. Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalisation
Trade would not affect individuals differently if the property rights over
productive factors were uniformly distributed in the population or if the
government implemented compensating transfers. The representative agent
model presented in previous sections assumes that resources are uniformly
distributed in the population. This assumption allowed us to focus on the
efficiency effects of trade liberalisation, leaving aside the distributional effects
of this policy. But the adjustment costs also have some interesting non trivial
consequences on the distributional effects of trade liberalisation. In order to
address this issue, we consider now a version of the dynamic-HO model with
heterogeneous population.
Owners of production factors receive the same return in both sectors, if
production factors are not specialised. With non-specialised labour, trade
equally affects all workers; the same is true for capitalists. Adjustment costs
do not modify this basic property of the HO model. But things are different
regarding to the property of firms. Because of adjustment costs, competitive
firms make non-zero profits and profits may differ across sectors. While owners
of firms in one sector may be making benefits, owners of firms in the other
sector may be suffering loses. These considerations led us to identify four
distinctive groups in the society: workers, capitalists, owners of firms in sector
A and owners of firms in sector B.6 Of course, societies are usually not so
neatly stratified, but this stark assumption about the distribution of property
rights is useful to highlight the distributional effects of trade liberalisation.
Table 2 summarises the effects of eliminating the tariff in the capital-intensive
sector on the welfare of these four different groups.
Workers are among the winners and capitalists are among the losers in
this example, because sector B –the one whose tariff is being eliminated– is
capital intensive. These are standard results from the static HO model. The
6 The government is assumed to channel the proceeds of tariffs to consumers of import
goods in a lump-sum fashion. This neutral assumption is made to isolate the effects of
distortions caused by tariffs from the income extraction effect which is common to any tax.115 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
Table 2. Welfare Gains from Trade Liberalisation, Heterogeneous
Population
Adjustment cost level




liberalisation in period 0 2,303 2,271 2,133 1,716 851
Liberalisation in period
20, announced in period 0 869 872 879 886 606
b) Capitalists
Unanticipated
liberalisation in period 0 -1,792 -1,775 -1,693 -1,438 -879
Liberalisation in period
20, announced in period 0 -677 -679 -682 -683 -513
c) Owners of firms in sector A
Unanticipated
liberalisation in period 0 0 13 66 219 515
Liberalisation in period
20, announced in period 0 0 1 2 11 115
d) Owners of firms in sector B
Unanticipated liberalisation
in period 0 0 -4 -24 -88 -235
Liberalisation in period
20, announced in period 0 0 1 2 5 -39
news is that owners of firms in the expanding sector receive a positive
discounted sum of profits, while owners of firms in the contracting sector
may or may not experience loses. At first glance, the first result looks easier
to understand than the second, but more careful analysis shows that both
results respond to quite complex general equilibrium dynamic effects. The
fact that the elimination of the tariff in sector B “favours” sector A does not116 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
imply that firms in this sector must make profits. Depending on the timing of
the process, firms in the expanding sector may even experience initial loses
(Figure 6 will present an example).
Adjustment costs reduce the impact of a sudden unanticipated trade
liberalisation on workers and capitalists (Table 2). The larger the adjustment
parameter, the smaller the welfare gains of the former and the welfare loses
of the latter. In turn, owners of firms are more affected when reallocating
resources is costly: owners of firms in the expanding sector are benefited the
more and owners of firms in the contracting sector are damaged the more, the
larger the adjustment parameter. Adjustment costs thus shift the burden of
the risk of unanticipated trade policy changes from owners of production
factors to owners of firms.7
Things are more complex in the case of a pre-announced liberalisation.
According to the results summarised in Table 2, workers get larger welfare
gains and capitalists experience larger loses the larger the adjustment parameter
for small and moderate levels. But sufficiently large adjustment costs reduce
gains and loses, just as they do in the unanticipated case. The ambiguity stems
from the crossing of the return curves for different levels of the parameter
(Figures 4 and 5). The wage and the return to capital start to change as soon
as the announcement is made. After the policy is announced and before it is
implemented, the return to production factors change faster the larger the
adjustment parameter. But after the tariff is actually eliminated, the return to
production factors change slower the larger are the costs involved. Therefore,
in this case adjustment costs do not always reduce the trade policy risk for
owners of production factors.
Pre-announcing trade liberalisation has non trivial effects on the value of
the firms and the welfare of their owners. The value of the firms in the
expanding sector rises in a pre-announced liberalisation, as it does in a surprise
unanticipated one. Also, it rises the more, the larger the adjustment cost
parameter. But unlike in the unanticipated liberalisation, the value of the firms
in the contracting sector may also rise when it is pre-announced, if the
parameter is not too large.
7 It is quite immediate that the same holds true for the risk of variation of international prices.117 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
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Figure 5. The Dynamics of Wages in a Pre-announced Liberalisation
The possibility that firms in the contracting sector increase their value
stems from the depressing effect of the announcement of the tariff elimination
on the return to capital, the factor in which the contracting sector is intensive.
The news that the protected sector will have to face an output price decline
due to the programmed elimination of the tariff, coupled with the existence
of costs of adjustment, induces firms in this sector to immediately start firing
High adjustment costs .......  Low adjustment costs
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resources and firms in the other sector to start hiring resources. Being the
contracting sector more intensive in the use of capital than the expanding
sector, capital becomes relatively abundant while labour becomes relatively
scarce. The return to capital decreases and the return to labour increases. The
decline in the return to capital relative to the return to labour favours the
capital-intensive protected sector and damages the labour-intensive export-
oriented sector. Therefore, immediately after the announcement, the expanding
sector experiences loses while the other makes profits. When the tariff is
eliminated, firms in the formerly protected sector face a sharp one-step decline
in the output price and start making loses. Firms in the expanding sector start
making profits, as the return to capital drops following the sharp decline in
the price of the good in the capital-intensive sector (Figure 6). Because of
these complex time profiles of the profits, a pre-announced reduction of a
tariff in presence of costs of adjustment may raise the value of the firms even
in the sector that is being unprotected. Postponing the measure obviously
reduces the present value of the welfare gains and loses caused by the
elimination of the tariff. As it comes clear from Table 2, the unanticipated
liberalisation in period zero yields larger gains and loses than the liberalisation
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8 The difference is even larger if the liberalisation in period twenty is not pre-announced.
in period twenty announced in period zero.8 But this observation is not
particularly illuminating: indefinitely postponing the liberalisation would cause
no gains and no loses. Not surprisingly, similar conclusions have been reported
in quite different frameworks (Mussa, 1986; Albuquerque and Rebelo, 1998).
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper revisits some of the issues analysed in Mussa (1986), assuming
net rather than gross adjustment costs in a dynamic version of a HO model of
trade. Some new issues arise. Firstly, as expected, trade liberalisation enhances
efficiency and there is no efficiency reason for postponing it in this HO model
with adjustment costs. But, if for other reasons, such as distributional concerns
and political support, the elimination of tariffs must be postponed, the
announcement of the policy has a positive effect on efficiency, speeding up
the reallocation of resources. Of course, announcing a future tax reduction
may have other distortionary effects on the intertemporal allocation of
consumption and savings, making the balance ambiguous. But we make the
point that the positive effect of the announcement fostering the reallocation
of resources should not be dismissed when reallocating resources is costly.
Previous literature on trade liberalisation that has not explicitly considered
the costs of adjustment did not take the efficiency value of the announcement
into account.
Adjustment costs reduce the efficiency gains from a sudden unanticipated
trade liberalisation. This is not surprising since the expected efficiency gains
stem from the reallocation of resources that is hindered by costly adjustment.
However, small to moderate adjustment costs may raise the efficiency gains
from a pre-announced liberalisation. Adjustment costs are needed for the
announcement of a future elimination of the tariff to induce the reallocation
of resources now. With zero adjustment costs, firms would wait until the
tariffs are actually eliminated to reallocate resources, and the announcement
would be valueless.
These results have implications for the design of reform packages that
involve both liberalising foreign trade and removing regulations that slow120 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
down the reallocation of resources. If the country is engaged in a gradual
process of trade liberalisation, it may not be optimal to fully remove these
regulations until the process of trade liberalisation is complete. Furthermore,
it would not be advisable to announce that the regulations that slow down the
adjustment process will be removed immediately after the elimination of
barriers to trade, for this announcement would eliminate the incentives to
reallocate resources before. This result is an application of the second-best
principle: removing a distortion may not be beneficial when other distortions
remain (for other examples of the same principle, see Edwards, 1988, and
Rama, 1997). Unfortunately, this principle is not easily applicable in practice.
Imperfect knowledge of the appropriate model and parameter values makes it
difficult to determine to what extent regulations that slow down adjustment
should be maintained. In any case, this second-best type of argument should
be taken into account in any careful assessment of a reform package.
The distributional effects of trade reform in the presence of adjustment
costs depend on whether the policy is pre-announced or not. By and large,
adjustment costs reduce the welfare gains and loses of owners of production
factors from a tariff elimination that is not anticipated. The burden of the risk
is mostly shifted to the owners of firms. When adjustment costs are present,
pre-announced trade liberalisations have more complex distributional effects
than unanticipated liberalisations. Owners of the production factor that is
negatively affected by the tariff elimination may experience larger loses with
moderate than with low adjustment costs. Owners of firms in the contracting
sector may experience welfare gains with a pre-announced liberalisation when
adjustment costs are moderate.
The results in this paper suggest that the costs of adjustment matter for the
political support for trade liberalisation, but they also suggest that this
relationship is complex. On one hand, large adjustment costs dampen the
efficiency gains from trade liberalisation and may thus reinforce protectionism.
Because of adjustment costs, the efficiency gains from freer trade take time
to materialise, reducing the appeal of liberalisation for the government,
particularly so if the government has to incur in some short run costs to
implement the reform. Moreover, protectionism has often contributed to raise
adjustment costs, since non-competitive environments favour lobbying for
regulations that create rents and reduce flexibility. Therefore, protectionism121 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENT
and regulations that increase rigidity may reinforce each other in a vicious
circle. On the other hand, adjustment costs impact on the distributive effects
of trade liberalisation potentially modifying the political support of the reform.
Nevertheless, no simple conclusion can be drawn from our analysis in this
respect. While some losers from liberalisation experience smaller loses, some
other losers suffer larger loses due to the adjustment costs. The opposition to
trade reform of the former may be ameliorated, but the opposition of the
latter will likely be exacerbated by the costs of adjustment.
The model presented in this paper is a dynamic extension of the standard
two-sectors-two-factors HO model of trade. In principle, the same approach
could be used to develop a dynamic extension of a HO model with more than
two factors and sectors. Such a model would be particularly interesting to
analyse the effects of trade liberalisation on the labour skill premium.9The
increasing skill premium that has accompanied some recent processes of trade
liberalisation in developing countries in which unskilled labour is abundant
is at odds with the basic predictions of the standard HO model. One possible
explanation is, of course, that in these cases the rise in the skill premium does
not respond to trade liberalisation, but to technological change or other
economic trends. Another complementary explanation could be explored with
an extension of the dynamic HO model that included both skilled and unskilled
labour. Notice in Figure 5 how the return to the production factor that is
eventually benefited with the freeing of trade decreases immediately after the
elimination of the tariff in a pre-announced liberalisation, if the adjustment
cost parameter is sufficiently large. In this fashion, the return to unskilled
labour could well decrease in the initial phase of the liberalisation process
and rise later on. The skill premium would thus exhibit a hump shaped path.
This is of course just an example, but it does suggest that introducing some
relatively simple dynamics can significantly increase the empirical explanatory
capacity of the HO model of trade.
9 The significant rise in wage inequality that has been documented in many countries during
the eighties and nineties has received much attention in the literature. Globalisation is one
of the competing explanations of this fact. See, among many others, Bound and Johnson,
1992; Acemoglu, 1999; Birdsall and Graham, 2000; and  Leamer, 2000.122 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Appendix. Consumers Program
Adding the consumers per period budget constraints, we can rewrite
program (8) with the intertemporal budget constraint:
We have imposed a transversality condition in the intertemporal budget
constraint, namely that the present value of net assets that consumers hold in
the infinitely far future is zero:
The first order conditions of this program imply equation (10). Using this
result back into (A.1), we rewrite the consumers program as:
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This is a linear programming problem. Indifference curves and budget lines in
the (CA, t, CA, t+1) space are both straight lines. The program yields corner
solutions unless the slope of the budget lines and the indifference curves
coincide, in which case consumers are indifferent between consuming in t or
in t + 1. Corner solutions are not consistent with credit market equilibrium, so
these slopes must coincide:
Equation (9) follows.
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